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The COVID-19 pandemic has renewed concerns over bioterror threats,
with Microsoft founder Bill Gates recently warning that a bioterror attack
involving a pathogen with a high death rate “is kind of the nightmare scenario” facing the planet. In this month’s feature article, J. Kenneth Wickiser, Kevin J. O’Donovan,
Lieutenant Colonel Michael Washington, Major Stephen Hummel, and Colonel F. John Burpo assess
the potential future threat posed by the malevolent use of synthetic biology. They write that synthetic biology “is a rapidly developing and diffusing technology. The wide availability of the protocols,
procedures, and techniques necessary to produce and modify living organisms combined with an
exponential increase in the availability of genetic data is leading to a revolution in science affecting
the threat landscape that can be rivaled only by the development of the atomic bomb.”
The authors, who all serve at, or are affiliated with, the Department of Chemistry and Life Science
at the United States Military Academy, note that synthetic biology has “placed the ability to recreate
some of the deadliest infectious diseases known well within the grasp of the state-sponsored terrorist
and the talented non-state actor” and that “the techniques used to propagate bacteria and viruses and
to cut and paste genetic sequences from one organism to another are approaching the level of skill
required to use a cookbook or a home computer.” They argue that “an effective response to the threats
posed by those using synthetic biology for nefarious purpose will require vigilance on the part of military planners, the development of effective medical countermeasures by the research community, and
the development of diagnostic and characterization technologies capable of discriminating between
natural and engineered pathogens.”
In our interview, Gilles de Kerchove, the European Union’s longtime Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, speaks to Raffaello Pantucci. Nuno Pinto presents a detailed case study of an alleged Portuguese Islamic State network with strong connections to the United Kingdom that sheds significant
light on the foreign fighter recruitment pipeline between Europe and Syria in the last decade. Tomasz
Rolbiecki, Pieter Van Ostaeyen, and Charlie Winter examine the threat posed by the Islamic State
across Africa based on a study of its attack claims. They write: “As the second half of 2020 unfolds, it
is critical that military and counterterrorism policymakers recognize what is at stake in Africa. The
Islamic State is not just fighting a low-grade insurgency on the continent; in at least two countries, it
has been able to seize and hold territory and subsequently engage in pseudo-state activities.”
Paul Cruickshank, Editor in Chief
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Engineered Pathogens and Unnatural Biological
Weapons: The Future Threat of Synthetic Biology
By J. Kenneth Wickiser, Kevin J. O’Donovan, Michael Washington,
Stephen Hummel, and F. John Burpo

Recent developments in biochemistry, genetics, and molecular biology have made it possible to engineer living organisms. Although these developments offer effective and
efficient means with which to cure disease, increase food
production, and improve quality of life for many people,
they can also be used by state and non-state actors to develop engineered biological weapons. The virtuous circle of
bioinformatics, engineering principles, and fundamental
biological science also serves as a vicious cycle by lowering
the skill-level necessary to produce weapons. The threat of
bioengineered agents is all the more clear as the COVID-19
pandemic has demonstrated the enormous impact that a
single biological agent, even a naturally occurring one, can
have on society. It is likely that terrorist organizations are
monitoring these developments closely and that the probability of a biological attack with an engineered agent is
steadily increasing.

T

he COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated that significant biological threats can and will emerge from
nature without warning, demonstrating that a single
viral strain can have a profound impact on modern society. It has also demonstrated that infectious diseases
can rapidly spread throughout a population without human engineering making them the ideal substrates from which to develop engineered weapons. Viruses and bacteria have been used as weapons
for millennia.1 Historically, biological weapons were derived from
natural sources, such as anthrax from herbivores and domesticated
animals, and smallpox from rodents. Those pathogenic organisms
that were found to be suitable for weaponization were cultured
directly from the environment; they were then isolated, purified,
stored, propagated,a and used to fill biological munitions.2 The most
recent of example of this was the production and stockpiling of numerous agents by the biological weapons program of the former
Soviet Union. In this program pathogens were selected for specific
characteristics directly from the natural environment, propagated, and stored for later use.3 While these pathogens have evolved
in nature for the purpose of persisting, they are not optimized for
maintenance, storage, and deployment in a military setting. Consequently, while biological agents have not been widely employed
as strategic or tactical weapons by state or non-state actors, there
are some examples of their use in conflicts. The most significant of
these is the well-documented use of crude bacteriological agents by

a

Propagation of bacteria means to provide nutrients so that the bacteria can
reproduce and be maintained as a viable entity.

the Japanese army against China during the Second World War.4
Recently, the convergence of advances in computer science,
engineering, biological science, and chemistry have made it pos-
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Electronic Microscope X150000, Variola (Smallpox) virus (BSIP/UIG via Getty Images)
sible to engineer living systems to optimize growth and increase
pathogenicity (the propensity to cause disease). This interdisciplinary approach to providing novel biological functionality has had
a positive impact on the biotechnological and biopharmaceutical
industries. At the same time, these engineered bacteria and viruses
can be co-opted for belligerent purposes. Indeed, the use of designer biological weapons could theoretically give a state or non-state
actor an asymmetric advantage over an adversary that favors conventional weapons.
Synthetic biology (SynBio) is the scientific discipline that encompasses all aspects of the engineering of biological systems.5
Beginning with the discovery of the chemical structure of DNAb in
the 1950s, SynBio tools such as recombinant DNA technologyc and
genome editing toolsd have developed at a fast pace as the fundamental molecular mechanisms underlying biology are discovered.
These SynBio tools are lowering the education, training, cost, time,
and equipment threshold required to modify and employ pathogenic organisms as biological weapons. The asymmetric threat posed

b

Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) is the genetic material in all living organisms
whereas RNA can serve as the genetic material for some viruses.

c

Recombinant DNA technology refers to widely employed techniques
to manipulate DNA segments and, in the process, modify genes and
organisms.

d

Genome editing tools refers to several now widely utilized enzyme
toolkits—e.g., TALEN (transcription activator-like effector nuclease) and
CRISPR (clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats)—to
precisely modify viral, bacterial, and eukaryotic genomes to achieve a
desired outcome.

by biological weapons will continue to increase as new tools and
techniques are developed and as terrorist organizations become
aware of and inspired by the society-wide economic, emotional, and
government-destabilizing impacts caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.e Indeed, it can be argued that the total cost of this pandemic—including the loss of life and the stress to the economy—could
be rivaled only by the deployment of an atomic bomb. Therefore,
developments in SynBio should be continually monitored and reassessed within the context of technological change and its capacity to
shift the geopolitical paradigm. In this article, the authors describe
how biological systems’ modular nature makes them amenable to
engineering, the recent advances in synthetic biology, the impact of
synthetic biology on the threat landscape, and the potential policy
responses to the maturation of biotechnology in general, and synthetic biology in particular. This article has been developed using
both primary and secondary literature sources recently published
in peer-reviewed scientific papers.

e

Juan Zarate, who served as Deputy National Security Advisor for
Combating Terrorism from 2005 to 2009, recently noted in this publication
that “the severity and extreme disruption of a novel coronavirus will likely
spur the imagination of the most creative and dangerous groups and
individuals to reconsider bioterrorist attacks.” Paul Cruickshank and Don
Rassler, “A View from the CT Foxhole: A Virtual Roundtable on COVID-19
and Counterterrorism with Audrey Kurth Cronin, Lieutenant General (Ret)
Michael Nagata, Magnus Ranstorp, Ali Soufan, and Juan Zarate,” CTC
Sentinel 13:6 (2020).
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The Inherent Modularity of Biological Systems
Modularity is essential to the purposeful engineering of biological
systems to create weapons. In general terms, modularity refers to
the ability to replace or update a piece of equipment. For example, a set of interchangeable parts is what allows an individual to
modify or optimize a complex piece of equipment, such as a home
computer or an automobile. The genetic material (DNA or RNA) of
any organism contains all of the information required for its proper
functioning and is comprised of many modular components. Specific genes can be removed from one pathogen and inserted into
another as a means of altering the activity of the recipient.6 This
modularity enables a measure of predictability of the effects on the
complex network of genes when employing molecular engineering
methods to insert a foreign gene into a host genome. For example, the modular nature of the non-pathogenic vaccine-strain of
the poliovirus genome is what enables it to acquire pathogenicity
genes from other viruses and revert to a pathogenic state (horizontal gene transfer).7 It has been postulated that molecular modularity
evolved as a natural genomic tool, allowing biological systems to
rapidly adapt to changing environmental conditions.8 While the
process of a virus acquiring pathogenicity has been occurring naturally through horizontal gene transfer for as long as these biological
agents have existed, the use of SynBio molecular engineering tools
provides a pathway to purposeful and precise changes in genomes
on fast timescales not found in nature. Modular genes can be mixed
and matched to increase the speed with which organisms can evolve
and adapt, producing the type of functionality required of a given
environment and providing the organism with a selective advantage
compared to its competitors. There is currently an effort underway to identify the minimal genome necessary for the survival of
the simplest strain of bacteria.9 Once it is determined what genes
are necessary for survival and reproducibility in bacteria, it may be
possible to swap-out non-essential genes for genes conferring any
number of desired characteristics. An increased understanding of
the modularity of biological systems will impact the fields of biosecurity and military medicine by providing a “molecular toolkit”
which can be used for peaceful purposes or by adversaries to design
and manufacture biological agents.

Synthetic Biology Enables the Design and Development of Biological Weapons
In 1997, a team of accomplished scientists within a group known as
the JASONf group met to discuss the future of biological warfare.10
They identified six emerging biological threats that needed to be
monitored by military planners and strategists: (1) the development
of binary weapons,g (2) the construction of designer genes, (3) the
use of gene therapy as a weapon, (4) the development of viruses that
evade the immune response of the host, (5) the use of viruses that

f

Founded in 1960, JASON is a group of American scientists dedicated
to producing reports of value to the U.S. federal government. The
organization’s relationship with the Department of Defense changed in
2019 when the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Research & Engineering)
(ASD (R&E)) cut ties with it. “Update: Legislator asks Pentagon to restore
contract for storied Jason science advisory group,” Science Magazine, April
11, 2019.

g

Binary biological weapons are organisms or biological products that
are non-lethal when separated and only become lethal upon mixing the
separate components together.
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“As the molecular engineering
techniques of the synthetic biologist
become more robust and widespread,
the probability of encountering one or
more of these threats is approaching
certainty.”
can move between insects, animals, and humans, and (6) the development of designer diseases. These threats were once considered
to be futuristic and speculative. Advances in SynBio techniques,
however, have moved many of these predicted contingencies from
the realm of speculation into the realm of reality. As the molecular
engineering techniques of the synthetic biologist become more robust and widespread, the probability of encountering one or more
of these threats is approaching certainty.
The extent and impact of SynBio on future state-on-state conflicts and terrorist violence will increase as the tools and techniques
of this discipline continue to mature and diffuse throughout the scientific community, as well as among the novice citizen-scientists in
the do-it-yourself biology labs that have emerged around the world
in recent years.11 The ability to produce custom-designed bacterial and viral pathogens will enhance the ability of hostile state and
non-state actors to develop and deploy relatively inexpensive and
efficient biological weapons. Additionally, some of these weapons
will likely be engineered with increased pathogenicity, environmental stability,h and the ability to withstand the shock of the rapid
changes in temperature and pressure that may accompany delivery
by explosive warhead. Below are several notable 21st century examples where scientists employed emergent SynBio techniques to
rediscover or recreate pathogenic microorganisms.
In 2002, scientists from the State University of New York at
Stony Brook chemically synthesized the complete poliovirus genome, highlighting the transformative potential of SynBio.12 While
this effort was accomplished by experienced professional scientists
over the course of years in well-equipped laboratories, the playbook
is now freely available and the tremendous advances in molecular
engineering techniques since then have only reduced the complexity of this once-monumental effort. This achievement was followed
by the first chemical synthesis of a much larger bacterial genome
in 2008 and the development of an entirely synthetic cell in 2010.13
The use of SynBio tools has endowed scientists with the ability to
purposefully dissect the inherently complex series of coupled chemical reactions that compose fundamental cellular metabolism.
These networks of reactions can be engineered using modular genes
and molecular tools to enhance synthetically produced organisms
with desired biochemical properties.14 Significantly, by combining
standard molecular and cellular laboratory techniques with cellular
selection (or evolution) strategies, which are accomplished daily
by high school and college students in biology classes and research
competitions across the world, detailed knowledge of the nature of

h

Environmental stability refers to the ability of a pathogen to survive outside
of a host where it is exposed to UV light, reactive oxygen species, and other
elements that could degrade or destroy the pathogen.
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each chemical reaction is not required to achieve the desired outcome for the engineered biological agent.15
In 2005, a group of researchers from the U.S. Centers for Disease
Control (CDC), the Mount Sinai School of Medicine, the Armed
Forces Institute of Pathology, and the Southeast Poultry Research
Laboratory reconstructed the 1918 pandemic influenza virus. This
was a particularly striking example of how the modular nature of
a viral genome could be used to manufacture a pathogen.16 The
reconstruction was performed by first determining the genomic
coding sequences of the virus from lung tissue specimens obtained
from pandemic victims who were preserved in permafrost.17 The
relevant DNA sequences were then inserted into a set of circular
DNA strands known as plasmids, which were subsequently used
to infect host human kidney cells. As predicted, fully functional
and replicative viral particles emerged from the kidney cells. The
pathogenicity of the reconstructed virus was evaluated in mice,
ferrets, and non-human primates, and it was found that the 1918
influenza strain was significantly more lethal than modern strains.18
It produced severe damage to the lungs, it stimulated an aberrant
immune response, and it led to the development of high viral titers
(levels of virus) in both the upper and lower respiratory tracts.19 The
reconstruction procedure was conducted in a standard molecular
biology laboratory setting, and all the materials needed for the construction of this viral particle are present in many university biology
laboratories. The methods that were employed are not beyond the
means of the talented amateur and therefore not beyond the means
of a dedicated, well-resourced terrorist organization.20
More recently in 2018, a small Canadian research group was
successful in constructing infectious horsepox virus directly from
genetic information obtained solely from a public database for the
relatively modest sum of $100,000 in U.S. currency.21 Horsepox is
a genetically distinct relative of the now extremely rare smallpox
virus. Smallpox was once a highly feared pandemic disease that either permanently disfigured or ended the lives of millions of people
worldwide. The same techniques used to construct horsepox can
easily be adapted to construct smallpox with a minimal investment
of time and money. SynBio has therefore placed the ability to recreate some of the deadliest infectious diseases known well within
the grasp of the state-sponsored terrorist and the talented non-state
actor.
The International Genetically Engineered Machine (iGEM)
competition provides another striking example of the ease by which
genetic engineering can be mastered at the undergraduate level.22
The iGEM competition was initiated by a group of non-biologist researchers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) who
wanted to develop and use synthetic biology tools similar to the way
electrical engineers use a breadboardi and a set of interchangeable
and scalable parts such as resistors and capacitors. These scientists
and engineers wanted to develop an easy-to-use system to genetically engineer bacteria by swapping genetic parts around to create
unique genes and gene sets that produce novel and useful proteins
and to force the organisms to perform tasks that they normally
would not accomplish. At its heart, the iGEM competition is an
agreed-upon set of molecular engineering techniques and a large

i

A breadboard is a base platform used in custom-designing electronic
circuits. Resistors, capacitors, and other electrical engineering components
are plugged into the breadboard to form a circuit to perform a desired
function.
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library of DNA parts that are accessed by the competitors in their
bid to create novel cellular tools, biological circuits, and gene products. As the competition progressed over the years, the participants
have taken advantage of nascent SynBio tools to improve the complexity of their designs. Today the sophistication of the high school
and undergraduate student research projects has matched that of
many highly trained personnel who were working in advanced laboratories less than a decade ago. While it has been claimed that
the young student competitors directed by a responsible Principal
Investigator are not truly independent,23 it is important to note that
the iGEM competition has a loose minimum age requirement,24
so the high school students are inexperienced with lab procedures
and have only a thin understanding of biology at the outset of the
competition. Yet by the time these students defend their work at
the Jamboree (international science fair held each fall), they have
either attained a full understanding of the work or they are judged
poorly. iGEM has helped democratize the science and engineering
of biological systems for the benefit of mankind. The organization
has dedicated significant resources to biosafety, bioethics, and biosecurity efforts25 drawing from the expertise of leaders in academia
and industry. Defense leaders need to take note of the spread of this
information because both state and non-state actors with nefarious
intent can benefit from the good work of these young scientists.
A case study in the dual-use nature of these activities can found
in the 2017 winning project. A team from Lithuania created a tool
to improve the rate of inheritance of genetically altered sequences
throughout generations of microbes. While this tool may eventually
be used by thousands of researchers for peaceful purposes, there is
a possibility that it could be harnessed to develop engineered biological weapons by rapidly altering the genomes of the starting
material. The Lithuanian team was just one of 295 teams competing that year. There were 125 from Asia, 84 from North America,
74 from Europe, 10 from Latin America, and two from Africa. This
competition and these technologies are truly global in nature, and
while they are intended for peaceful and mutually beneficial purposes, the science and tools created may be manipulated by those
with bad intentions.26

The Impact of Synthetic Biology on the Threat
Landscape
The threat landscape is constantly evolving as advances are made in
materials, computational power and speed, and the bioengineering
of viruses and cells. While there are challenges to weaponizing a
biological system, including contending with the analog nature of
biology, the advantages of bioweapons compared to relying on conventional explosives or nuclear weapons include their self-generating properties and the ease in creating a binary weapon allowing
for safe production and assembly.27 Thus, it is possible for an unsophisticated adversary to design biological weapons with enhanced
virulence and infectivity. As already noted, one challenge to weaponizing a biological system is the analog nature of most metabolic
circuitry (compared to the digital signals governing much of the
electronic world). Further challenges are the presence of significant
noise in the normal operation and response of these biochemical
circuits and the difficulty in optimizing synthetic pathways while
retaining the viability and reproducibility of the living system.28
However, the use of natural selection techniques in the lab preclude
the need for detailed rational design so that an amateur scientist
member of a terrorist organization can simply employ SynBio tech-
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“The techniques used to propagate
bacteria and viruses and to cut and
paste genetic sequences from one
organism to another are approaching
the level of skill required to use a
cookbook or a home computer.”

niques for a large number of cells and select those that perform to
the desired effect.
Cells are the fundamental unit of life containing all the molecular architecture required to engage in metabolism (transfer energy),
grow, adapt to their environment, respond to stimuli, reproduce,
and evolve. Under the right conditions, cells will replenish and
increase their numbers if there exists enough food and space. A
scientist who has engineered a cell with novel properties can keep
producing that system by simply feeding the cells, clearing out the
waste products, and harvesting cells when desired. Cell-based systems have co-evolved with viruses that target very specific cell types
using lock-and-key-like receptor proteins on both the virus and cell.
While viruses rely on cells to reproduce, it is standard lab practice to produce significant quantities of viruses using their cognate
cells [cells taken over by the viruses] as hosts. Unlike conventional
weapons, biological weapon development requires all the work up
front and then the system will reproduce and provide the bad actor
with a supply of the weapon as long as the growth-permissive environment is maintained.
SynBio also facilitates the development of binary biological
weapons. Although the design and production of binary biological
weapons may have been difficult in the past, the ability to engineer
and ‘boot-up’ entire genomes has revolutionized the process. With
modern synthetic biology tools, an undergraduate student could
conceivably engineer and produce two related, non-lethal viruses
that are individually harmless. However, following host infection
with the two viruses, mixing of the two strains allows for a full restoration and production of highly infectious, pathogenic viruses.
Importantly, such genetic mixing has also been documented in nature wherein two or more non-pathogenic poliovirus vaccine strains
can recombine to form pathogenic recombinants.29 Thus, it is not
difficult to imagine a non-state actor developing binary weapons
consisting of components stored separately for safety in transport
and then brought together in a biological munition prior to delivery.
The advances in SynBio have not occurred in isolation. The increase in the understanding of biological systems and the development of the tools of molecular biology that occurred in the late
20th and early 21st centuries were paralleled by commensurate
developments in automation, engineering, computer science, and
information technology. In particular, the ease of scaling-up the
production of bacteria and viruses has increased exponentially in
recent decades due to the availability of inexpensive instrumentation for the growth, or culture, of biological material, and the
development of standardized reagents such as bacterial growth
media by commercial laboratories.30 Once the purview of scientists
with doctorates in microbiology, genetic engineering is practiced
every day in high schools and colleges across the world. The in-
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structions, or protocols, for these processes are freely available on
the internet and in undergraduate microbiology and cell biology
textbooks. Many of the difficulties faced by early microbiologists
and cell biologists in the culturing of microorganisms have lessened; indeed, many advanced placement biology programs in high
schools across the United States include blocks of instruction on
culturing and engineering Escherichia coli (E. coli) and other benign bacterial species.31 Some authors have argued that the skills
and abilities developed over the course of a career in the biological
sciences are not available to the amateur and that this may hinder
the widespread use of synthetic biology for the development of biological weapons.32 While this argument may be true for some of
the more complex techniques in biochemistry and molecular biology, the techniques used to propagate bacteria and viruses and to
cut and paste genetic sequences from one organism to another are
approaching the level of skill required to use a cookbook or a home
computer. A vast amount of knowledge would be necessary to describe in detail the biochemistry, genetics, and physiology of baker’s
yeast, but anyone with a cookbook, flour, yeast, and sugar can bake
bread. Similarly, understanding the algorithms necessary to manipulate images on a computer screen requires expert knowledge, but
anyone can point at an icon with a mouse to open it. As technology
increases and spreads, those with a simple home laboratory system
may be able to manipulate bacterial and viral genes without expert
training or years of experience.

Policy Responses to the Potential Threats Posed by
Synthetic Biology
An effective response to the threats posed by those using synthetic
biology for nefarious purpose will require vigilance on the part of
military planners, the development of effective medical countermeasuresj by the research community, and the development of diagnostic and characterization technologies capable of discriminating
between natural and engineered pathogens. A 2002 biological
warfare counterproliferation study identified six key basic biological research areas that should be emphasized to protect against
the threat: human genomics; immunology and the development
of methods for the boosting the immune response; bacterial and
viral genomics; bacterial and viral assay development;k vaccine
development; and the development of novel antiviral agents and
antibiotics.33 A continued research and education effort within the
Department of Defense will be required to develop and maintain
expertise in each of these areas.
The rapid availability of experienced civilian and military personnel is a prerequisite for effective incident response. Therefore,
training and education in SynBio, biological engineering, and related disciplines should be emphasized and funded. Many organizations already exist to meet the threat of natural, man-made,
and weaponized biological material. These organizations include
the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA); the Chemical and

j

According to the U.S. government, “Medical countermeasures, or MCMs,
are FDA-regulated products (biologics, drugs, devices) that may be
used in the event of a potential public health emergency stemming from
a terrorist attack with a biological, chemical, or radiological/nuclear
material, or a naturally occurring emerging disease.” “What are Medical
Countermeasures?” fda.gov, accessed August 27, 2020.

k

Viral and bacterial assay development refers to generating new methods
for the rapid detection and identification of viral and bacterial pathogens.
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“The wide availability of the
protocols, procedures, and techniques
necessary to produce and modify
living organisms combined with
an exponential increase in the
availability of genetic data is leading
to a revolution in science affecting the
threat landscape that can be rivaled
only by the development of the atomic
bomb.”

Biological Center (CBC) at Edgewood, Maryland; the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA); the Biomedical
Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA); the
National Institutes of Health (NIH); the Centers for Disease Control (CDC); and United Stated Department of Agriculture-Agricultural Research Service (USDA-ARS) within the United States.
The World Health Organization (WHO), a specialized organization within the United Nations, and several research and response
organizations in other countries have historically served similar
purposes. Each of these entities deal with systems rooted in the
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natural world, and while some organizations restrict their focus to
naturally occurring threats, they all deal—in one way or another—
with the extraordinary pace of technology development unique to
the biomedical community. Every advancement in biomedicine is
dual-use, and so it is incumbent upon those privileged to work in
the scientific field to predict the ways that these technologies might
be used for nefarious purpose and to develop the technologies and
systems necessary to undermine the efforts of those who might use
these unique biological entities as weapons.

Conclusion
SynBio is a rapidly developing and diffusing technology. The wide
availability of the protocols, procedures, and techniques necessary
to produce and modify living organisms combined with an exponential increase in the availability of genetic data is leading to a revolution in science affecting the threat landscape that can be rivaled
only by the development of the atomic bomb. As the technology
improves, the level of education and skills necessary to engineer biological agents decreases. Whereas only state actors historically had
the resources to develop and employ biological weapons, SynBio is
changing the threat paradigm. The economic and social impact of
COVID-19 has highlighted the broad and lasting effects that can
result from the spread of a novel biological agent. This collective
experience has increased the chance that terrorist organizations
will attempt to use biological agents to asymmetrically attack the
United States and its allies. This possibility should be anticipated
and planned for at all levels of government. CTC
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